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ABSTRACT 
 
Under Canada’s Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act RSC 1985, c C-36  
(“CCAA”), a restructuring plan typically releases creditor claims against the debtor 
company. Occasionally, a restructuring plan will also release creditor claims against third 
parties, such as the debtor’s auditor. These releases are known as third-party releases. 
Third-party releases are a controversial feature of Canadian restructuring proceedings. 
Nonetheless, the approval of third-party releases is an emerging trend under the CCAA.    
In 2013, Morawetz J approved a $117 million settlement in an Ontario class 
action. The settlement was approved as a part of the Sino-Forest Corporation CCAA 
proceeding. It gave Ernst & Young a full third-party release and barred opt-outs. Some 
class members argued that the settlement was unrelated to the restructuring and that it 
violated their opt-out rights under Ontario’s class action legislation. Morawetz J approved 
the settlement with the third-party release, holding that opt-out rights can be 
compromised in a CCAA proceeding. Thus, his decision is significant to both insolvency 
and class action law. This paper analyzes the decision and its implications. 
The decision demonstrates that CCAA courts are increasingly willing to approve 
third-party releases, which is a positive development in the law. Proper third-party 
releases can lead to faster negotiations, larger settlements and smoother restructurings. 
Thus, releases can maximize benefits for stakeholders and minimize strain on the courts. 
The decision also clarifies the relationship between the CCAA and class action 
legislation, striking a suitable balance between insolvency and class action policy goals.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2013, Morawetz J approved a $117 million settlement in an Ontario class action.1 The 
settlement resolved claims by security holders of Sino-Forest Corporation (“SFC”) against Ernst 
& Young (“E&Y”) in relation to auditing work for SFC (the “EY Settlement”). It made headlines 
as the largest-ever auditor settlement in a Canadian securities class action.2 Significantly, it was 
approved as a part of SFC’s Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act3 (“CCAA”) proceeding. 
Thus, the Sino-Forest Settlement decision is significant to both insolvency and class action law.  
The EY Settlement gave E&Y a full third-party release4 and barred opt-outs. Some class 
members argued that the EY Settlement was unrelated to SFC’s restructuring and that it violated 
their opt-out rights under Ontario’s Class Proceedings Act5 (“CPA”). Morawetz J approved the 
EY Settlement, holding that CPA opt-out rights can be compromised in a CCAA proceeding. 
Sino-Forest Settlement reveals that CCAA courts are increasingly willing to approve 
third-party releases, which is a positive development in the law. Proper third-party releases can 
lead to faster negotiations, larger settlements and smoother restructurings. Thus, releases can 
maximize benefits for stakeholders and minimize strain on the courts. Morawetz J also clarified 
the relationship between the CCAA and the CPA, striking a suitable balance between insolvency 
and class action policy considerations. This paper analyzes the decision and its implications. 
1. SINO-FOREST SETTLEMENT  
 
In 2011, security holders brought class actions against SFC, naming E&Y as a defendant. 
SFC obtained CCAA protection. A stay of proceedings was extended to claims against E&Y. The 
                                                
1 Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada (Trustees of) v Sino-Forest Corp, 2013 ONSC 1078 
[Sino-Forest Settlement], leave to appeal to CA refused, 2013 ONCA 456 [Sino-Forest Appeal 1], leave to appeal to 
SCC refused, [2013] SCCA No 395 (QL) [Sino-Forest Appeal 2].   
2 See e.g. Jeff Buckstein, “E&Y agrees to record settlement”, The Bottom Line 29:3 (March 2013) (QL). 
3 RSC 1985, c C-36 [CCAA]. 
4 “Third-party release” refers to the release of a claim against a party other than the debtor (e.g. the debtor’s auditor). 
5 SO 1992, c 6, s 9 [CPA].  
 2 of 12 
settlement framework was added to SFC’s CCAA plan (the “SFC Plan”). The EY Settlement 
provided that E&Y would pay $117 million for a third-party release with no opt-outs. Six 
institutional shareholders (the “Objectors”) opposed the EY Settlement and purported to opt out. 
They argued that it violated their CPA opt-out rights and was unnecessary to the SFC Plan.   
1.1. Morawetz J Approves the EY Settlement 
 
(a) There is No Right to Opt Out Under the CCAA 
 Fundamentally, Morawetz J reasoned that the class proceedings were inseparable from 
the CCAA proceeding. The EY Settlement was part of a CCAA plan. The class action claims 
against E&Y stemmed from the claims against SFC. E&Y had a contractual right to contribution 
and indemnity against SFC, which was triggered by the class action claims (the “Indemnity 
Claim”). As a result, all of the class action claims were a part of the CCAA proceeding. The 
Objectors did not file an individual proof of claim, which meant class counsel could agree to a 
binding CCAA compromise on their behalf. Thus, the Objectors were trying to opt out of a CCAA 
compromise. Morawetz J held that it is impossible to opt out of a CCAA compromise.6  
 (b) CCAA Factors for Approving Settlements & Third-Party Releases  
 Morawetz J applied two overlapping sets of CCAA factors in approving the settlement. 
First, he set out the following general test:  
(i) whether the settlement is fair and reasonable; 
(ii) whether it provides substantial benefits to other stakeholders; and 
(iii) whether it is consistent with the purpose and spirit of the CCAA.7 
 
Second, approving the third-party release required applying the “nexus test” established 
by the Ontario Court of Appeal.8 Morawetz J listed four factors to be considered when deciding 
                                                
6 Sino-Forest Settlement, supra note 1 at para 36: “Claims…are regularly compromised and settled within CCAA 
proceedings. This includes outstanding litigation claims against the debtor and third parties. Such compromises 
fully and finally dispose of such claims, and it follows that there are no continuing procedural or other rights in 
such proceedings. Simply put, there are no "opt-outs" in the CCAA [emphasis added].” 
7 Ibid at para 49, citing Robertson v ProQuest Information & Learning Co, 2011 ONSC 1647 at para 22 [Robertson].  
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if there is “a reasonable connection between the third party claim being compromised…and the 
restructuring achieved by the plan to warrant inclusion of the third-party release in the plan”:9  
(i) are the claims to be released rationally related to the purpose of the plan? 
(ii) are the claims to be released necessary for the plan of arrangement? 
(iii) are the parties who have claims released against them contributing in a 
tangible and realistic way? 
(iv) will the plan benefit the debtor and the creditors generally? 
 
 (c) The CCAA Factors Supported the EY Settlement & Third-Party Release 
 Morawetz J held that a “significant aspect” of SFC’s plan was a distribution of settlement 
funds to relevant stakeholders.10 The $117 million was the only funding for the distribution. 
Without the release E&Y would not provide the funds, and a key goal of the SFC Plan would 
remain unfulfilled. The $117 million was a substantial, tangible contribution. Thus, Morawetz J 
rejected the claim that the EY Settlement was unnecessary or unrelated to the SFC Plan. 
As well, Morawetz J noted that the third-party release was integral to the SFC Plan. The 
Objectors’ claims against E&Y were inextricably linked to E&Y’s Indemnity Claim. Without the 
release, the litigation against E&Y would continue. The litigation would then become “circular 
in nature” due to the Indemnity Claim against SFC.11 Thus, Morawetz J was satisfied that the 
third-party release for E&Y was rationally connected and necessary to the SFC Plan.  
 Overall, Morawetz J held that the settlement was fair and reasonable, benefitted 
stakeholders, and was consistent with the CCAA.12 Several notable findings supported his 
decision. First, a large majority of creditors approved the SFC Plan with notice of the effect of 
the releases. Second, the release was not too broad or offensive to public policy. Third, claimants 
                                                                                                                                                       
8 ATB Financial v Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp, 2008 ONCA 587 [ATB Financial]. 
9 Sino-Forest Settlement, supra note 1 at para 50, citing ATB Financial, supra note 8 at para 70. 
10 Ibid at para 60.  
11 Ibid at para 62.  
12 Ibid at para 66.  
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would receive $117 million while avoiding the risks of further litigation. Finally, Morawetz J 
accepted that without the EY Settlement, the Indemnity Claim would have to be finally 
determined to calculate the CCAA claims. The EY Settlement avoided delays and litigation that 
may have depleted SFC’s assets. The release of the Indemnity Claim “allowed SFC and the SFC 
subsidiaries to contribute their assets unencumbered by claims totaling billions of dollars.”13 
Thus, the EY Settlement benefitted the SFC Plan, the debtor and SFC creditors generally.  
1.2. Refusal of the Leave Applications  
 
 The Objectors sought to appeal the orders sanctioning the SFC Plan and EY Settlement. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that the appeal from the sanction order was 
moot because the SFC Plan was already in place.14 The Court also found that Morawetz J applied 
the correct tests for approving CCAA settlements and third-party releases. In 2014, the Supreme 
Court of Canada also refused leave to appeal.15 Thus, Sino-Forest Settlement remains the most 
current leading case on third-party releases and the interplay between the CPA and the CCAA.16 
2. IMPLICATIONS 
 
2.1. The Appropriate Test is the Nexus Test, not an Exceptional Circumstances Test  
 
 A CCAA plan typically releases creditor claims against the debtor. Occasionally, a plan 
will also release creditor claims against third parties. Prior to SFC’s insolvency, the approval of 
broad third-party releases was an emerging trend in CCAA proceedings.17 However, Canadian 
case law sends mixed messages as to when third-party releases are justifiable. An early decision 
                                                
13 Ibid at paras 68. 
14 Sino-Forest Appeal 1, supra note 1 at para 11.  
15 Sino-Forest Appeal 2, supra note 1. 
16 Notably, the United States Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York recently recognized the EY 
Settlement, applying the principle of comity: Re Sino-Forest Corp, 501 BR 655 (Bankr SDNY 2013).  
17 Re Muscletech Research and Development Inc (2007), 30 CBR (5th) 59 [Muscletech]; ATB Financial, supra note 
8; Re Grace Canada Inc (2008), 50 CBR (5th) 25 [Grace]; Re Nortel Networks Corp, 2010 ONSC 1708 [Nortel]; Re 
Allen-Vanguard Corp, 2011 ONSC 4208 [Vanguard]. 
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rejected third-party releases as an abuse of the CCAA.18 As well, some decisions stress such 
releases “should be the exception” and should not be not granted “as a matter of course.”19 There 
is also arguably a pattern in Canadian law to suggest an “exceptional circumstances” standard.20  
However, an exceptional circumstances standard is undesirable. CCAA releases are not 
justified based on the uniqueness of the situation. The nexus between the release and the 
restructuring plan, coupled with the flexibility of the CCAA, is what engages a CCAA court’s 
jurisdiction.21 Morawetz J appropriately refocused the analysis on whether the third-party release 
can be justified as part of a “comprehensive compromise.”22 The nexus test prevents abuse by 
ensuring third parties only earn releases through significant contributions to a CCAA plan. Thus, 
past warnings can be read as a “word of caution” rather than a “substantive shift in approach.23    
2.2. “Necessary for the Plan” can Mean Necessary for a “Significant Aspect” of the Plan 
 
 Some cases suggest that the entire CCAA plan must depend on the third-party release to 
satisfy the nexus test.24 Sino-Forest Settlement demonstrates that a release can be justified if it is 
necessary for a “significant aspect” of the plan.25 The SFC Plan was already in place, indicating 
                                                
18 Steinberg Inc c Michaud (1993), 42 CBR (5th) 1 at paras 65-68 (QCA).  
19 Re Canwest Global Communications Corp, 2010 ONSC 4209 at paras 28-29 [Canwest]; Vanguard, supra note 17 
at paras 60-61 
20 Muscletech involved a “unique liquidation plan”: supra note 17 at para 2. ATB Financial involved a plan to 
correct a “liquidity crisis” affecting the entire asset-backed commercial paper industry: supra note 8 at paras 56-57. 
21 ATB Financial, supra note 8 at paras 43, 70. See also Century Services v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 
60 at paras 14-15, 62-63 [Century Services]. CCAA s 11 authorizes a court to make any order it considers 
appropriate on an application in respect of a debtor: supra note 3. Thus, Parliament granted courts broad general 
discretionary powers that make the CCAA flexible. 
22 Sino-Forest Settlement, supra note 1 at para 47, citing ATB Financial, supra note 8 at paras 69-70.  
23 Adam C Maerov, Tushara Weerasooriya & Ahsan Mirza, “The Use of Releases in CCAA Restructuring 
Proceedings: How Wide is the Net?” (Paper delivered at the OBA Institute of Continuing Professional 
Development, 3-5 February 2011), [unpublished]. 
24 Ibid at 19: “In both ATB Financial and Muscletech, the funding to be provided by the released parties (and 
therefore the plan itself) was contingent upon the third parties being released. Therefore, the existence of the plan, as 
opposed to its probability of success, depended on the compromise of claims in favour of those parties.” 
25 Sino-Forest Settlement, supra note 1 at para 60.  
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it was not contingent on the EY Settlement. 26  Further, the release did not seem necessary to give 
effect to the release of E&Y’s Indemnity Claim. Re Sino-Forest27 established that the Indemnity 
Claim was an “equity claim”, which meant it was subordinated under the CCAA.28 The SFC Plan 
cancelled all “equity claims” on the plan implementation date, prior to settlement approval. The 
Objectors seized on this argument in their first leave application. They characterized the EY 
Settlement as an “eleventh-hour add on” with a collateral purpose unrelated to the restructuring.29  
 As a matter of policy, E&Y’s release can be justified even if it was not required to release 
the Indemnity Claim. First, the settlement distribution was a significant aspect of the SFC Plan. 
Thus, the SFC Plan could not fully succeed without the release. Second, releases can incentivize 
third parties to participate in a restructuring.30 Notably, section 5.1(1) of the CCAA was enacted 
to encourage directors to stay in office and help restructurings.31 Auditors are analogous to 
directors, as their cooperation can be crucial to a plan. SFC called E&Y a “catalyst” in securing 
plan approval.32 Morawetz J accepted that E&Y helped the process along and reduced costs.33  
 Third, CCAA proceedings involve balancing competing interests. In Century Services, the 
Supreme Court of Canada explained that a CCAA court must consider “all of the various interests 
at stake in the reorganization…even other parties doing business with the insolvent company.”34 
This is especially true where a third party has indemnity claims against the debtor that have been 
                                                
26 Ibid at paras 60-62. The EY Settlement was contingent on court approval, but the core of the SFC plan was 
already in place. It involved the transfer of most of SFC’s assets to a new creditor-owned corporation called Newco.  
27 2012 ONSC 4377, aff’d 2012 ONCA 816 [Re Sino-Forest Appeal]. 
28 In 2009, the CCAA was amended to subordinate equity claims until all other creditor claims are paid in full: 
CCAA, supra note 3 at s 6(8). Re Sino-Forest Appeal confirmed that the CCAA definition of “equity claim” in s 2 
includes both shareholder claims and auditors’ indemnity claims arising from shareholder claims. Effectively, this 
meant that E&Y faced liability for the entirety of the shareholders’ claims, without any contribution from SFC.  
29 Sino-Forest Settlement Appeal 1, supra note 1 (Factum of the Appellant at paras 68-70).  
30 Janis Sarra, “Restructuring of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market in Canada” (2008) 9 Ann Rev Insolv L 
at 10 (WL Can).    
31 NBD Bank, Canada v Dofasco Inc, 181 DLR (4th) 37 at para 54 (Ont CA), citing LW Houlden and CH Morawetz, 
The Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act: 2000 (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at 192.  
32 Sino-Forest Settlement, supra note 1 at para 56.  
33 Ibid at paras 67-70.  
34 Supra note 21 at para 60.  
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subordinated by the CCAA. Regardless of whether E&Y released its Indemnity Claim directly in 
exchange for its third-party release, the SFC Plan extinguished E&Y’s rights against SFC. As a 
directly affected stakeholder in the SFC Plan, E&Y’s interests also had to be considered.  
Morawetz J fairly balanced the interests of all relevant stakeholders. The class members, 
including the Objectors, received a sizable settlement. In exchange, E&Y received a third-party 
release. The general creditors benefitted from E&Y’s participation and the release of the 
Indemnity Claim. In sum, the release maximized the available benefits for all stakeholders.  
Fourth, if the Objectors opted out, it would have harmed other claimants. The settlement 
would have unraveled without E&Y’s release, and all parties would have incurred further legal 
expenses. The Objectors were but a fraction of SFC shareholders.35 As noted by Morawetz J, the 
CCAA requires considering the interests of similarly situated stakeholders as a whole.36 Thus, 
opt-outs would have undermined the spirit of compromise underlying the CCAA.  
Finally, the release fell within the jurisdiction of the CCAA court and was in line with the 
goals of the CCAA. The Ontario Court of Appeal has found that the authority to grant third-party 
releases is implicit in the CCAA.37 As well, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that the CCAA 
is a “flexible mechanism” for achieving the purpose of avoiding the “social and economic costs” 
of liquidation.38 Complex reorganizations often require courts to find creative ways to minimize 
economic costs for stakeholders. The Supreme Court of Canada specifically noted third-party 
releases as a creative measure courts can approve to help a restructuring.39 Thus, E&Y’s release 
                                                
35 Sino-Forest Settlement, supra note 1 at para 79. The Objectors held just 1.6% of SFC shares, and constituted 
“approximately 0.24% of the 34,177 SFC beneficial shareholders as of April 29, 2011.” 
36 Ibid at paras 70, 74. 
37 ATB Financial, supra note 8 at para 43. 
38 Century Services, supra note 21 at paras 14-15.   
39 Ibid at para 62.  
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seems justifiable under the CCAA in light of E&Y’s (1) sacrifice of its Indemnity Claim; (2) 
active participation in the SFC Plan; and (3) large monetary contribution to the security holders. 
2.3. Fraud & the Scope of Third-Party Releases  
 
 The third-party release in the EY Settlement was broad enough to include fraud claims. 
Morawetz J confirmed that releases could extend to claims for fraud.40 The appropriate scope of 
releases is a contentious issue that raises public policy arguments.41 Several court-approved 
releases have included carve-outs for fraud and wilful misconduct.42 While director releases are 
permitted under the CCAA, releases for misrepresentations are prohibited.43 It will be interesting 
to see if there is a legislative response to the judicial treatment of releases that encompass fraud. 
For now, CCAA courts appear to be open to approving increasingly broad releases. 
2.4. The Interaction Between Class Proceedings & CCAA Proceedings 
 
(a) Pre-Sino-Forest Settlement Tensions between the CCAA and the CPA 
The CPA allows multiple plaintiffs to litigate common issues in one representative action. 
It promotes three objectives: judicial economy, access to justice and behaviour modification.44 
The CPA affords all class members the right to opt out of a class action.45 Opt-out rights are a 
fundamental element of procedural fairness in class actions.46 Under the CCAA, a debtor may 
obtain an order staying any action,47 and stays can be extended to class actions against third 
                                                
40 Sino Forest Settlement, supra note 1 at para 48, citing ATB Financial, supra note 8 at para 111.  
41 See ATB Financial, supra note 8 at para 110.  
42 See Canwest, supra note 19; ATB Financial, supra note 8; Nortel, supra note 17.  
43 CCAA, supra note 3, s 5.1(1). As well, section 19(2)(d) prohibits releasing claims for fraud and other wilful 
misconduct unless the individual creditor votes to accept the compromise. However, the provision appears to apply 
to claims against debtors, not third parties. 19(2)(d) also provides that it does not apply to equity claims.   
44 Hollick v Toronto (City), [2001] 3 SCR 158 at para 28.  
45 CPA, supra note 5, s 9. The CPA guards against extinguishing claimants’ rights to pursue individual actions. 
46 Sauer v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 ONSC 4399 at para 19. 
47 CCAA, supra note 3, s 11.02.  
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parties.48 CCAA courts can approve binding class action settlements under the CCAA, including 
those containing full third-party releases.49 Thus, the CCAA can conflict with CPA opt-out rights. 
Early cases did not fully clarify the interplay between the CCAA and the CPA. Decisions 
involving both statutes tended to be “styled in both proceedings.”50 In Roberston, Pepall J 
applied the tests for settlement approval from both statutory regimes.51 Pepall J noted “a certain 
symmetry” between the CCAA and CPA tests, and approved the settlement under both.52 In 
McCarthy v Canadian Red Cross Society,53 Winkler J called the tests “markedly different.”54 
Interestingly, he initially rejected a third-party release, noting that class members needed more 
information “to decide whether to exercise their right to opt out.”55 His reasoning suggested that 
CPA opt-out rights apply to class action settlements approved under the CCAA. Thus, the pre-
Sino-Forest Settlement case law did not fully clarify the relationship between two statutes. 
(b) The CCAA is Paramount to the CPA 
 Morawetz J noted that class action settlements require court approval of the settlement 
and the “notice and process for dissemination of the settlement.”56 Thus, a CCAA court will 
afford the basic procedural protections of the CPA. However, unlike the cases discussed above, 
Morawetz J approved the settlement based solely on the substantive tests used under the CCAA.  
His decision also clarifies the relationship between the CCAA and the CPA in a conflict. 
In effect, Morawetz J held that the doctrine of paramountcy applies. If a claim is entangled with 
                                                
48 This is appropriate if the debtor agreed to indemnify the third party and the claims against the third party arise 
from claims against the debtor: Re Muscletech Research and Development Inc (2006), 25 CBR (5th 231) at paras 7-9. 
49 See Muscletech, supra note 17; Grace, supra note 17; Vanguard, supra, note 17.   
50 Jay A Swartz & Natasha J MacPharland, “Canwest Publishing: A Tale of Two Plans” (2010) 2 Ann Rev Insolv L 
at 27 (WL Can).  
51 Supra note 7 at paras 20-26. The test for approving class actions settlements is whether “in all of the 
circumstances, the settlement is fair, reasonable and in the best interests of those affected by it.” 
52 Ibid. 
53 [2001] OJ No 567 (QL) (ONSC).  
54 Ibid at para 15. 
55 Ibid at para 23. He later approved the release with no mention of opt-out rights: [2001] OJ No 2474 (QL) (ONSC). 
56 Sino-Forest Settlement, supra note 1 at para 38 citing Robertson, supra note 20 at para 8.  
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CCAA claims, it is subject to compromise. There is no right to opt out of a CCAA compromise. 
On this point, Justice Morawetz’s decision is in line with the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision 
in ATB Financial.57 Opt-out rights are fundamental in class actions, and will not be extinguished 
lightly under the CCAA. However, if CPA and CCAA proceedings overlap, “opt out rights must 
be considered within the umbrella of rights afforded under both legislative regimes”.58  
(b) Other Practical Implications  
 The availability of broader releases during CCAA proceedings gives third parties a strong 
incentive to reach timely settlements. In light of the ruling subordinating indemnity claims in Re 
Sino-Forest Appeal, auditors defending securities class actions face exposure to greater potential 
liability. Given that security holders are also effectively unable to recover from a CCAA debtor, 
solvent auditors make attractive defendants. Thus, auditors will be anxious to cap their liability.  
This can create a “win/win” situation for security holders and third parties.59 Security 
holders can use third-party releases to leverage larger settlements from third party defendants. 
Sino-Forest Settlement demonstrates a creative way to effect a distribution to equity claimants 
under a CCAA plan, despite the subordination of equity claims under the CCAA.60 Justice 
Morawetz recently approved the settlement distribution process, which sets aside $5 million for 
                                                
57 Supra note 8 at para 104: “The power to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement that contains third-party 
releases…is embedded in the wording of the CCAA. The fact that this may interfere with a claimant's right to pursue 
a civil action…is constitutionally immaterial. The CCAA is a valid exercise of federal power. Provided the matter in 
question falls within the legislation directly or as necessarily incidental to the exercise of that power, the CCAA 
governs. To the extent that its provisions are inconsistent with provincial legislation, the federal legislation is 
paramount.” 
58 Michael A Eizenga, Class Actions Law and Practice, loose-leaf (consulted on March 18, 2014) (Markham ON: 
LexisNexis Canada, 2008), ch 5 at 5.78.4.  
59 Robert W Staley, Derek J Bell & Jonathan G Bell, “Sino-Forest: More Lessons as a Chapter Closes” (17 March 
2014), online: Bennett Jones < http://www.bennettjones.com/Publications/Updates/Sino-
Forest__More_Lessons_as_a_Chapter_Closes/>. 
60 Presumably, this is permissible because the underlying purpose of CCAA s 6(8) is to prevent the depletion of the 
debtor’s assets that are available to satisfy general creditors’ claims: Re Sino-Forest Appeal, supra note 27 at para 
55. Settlement proceeds from claims against third parties are not assets of the debtor that are available to general 
creditors, and thus can be distributed directly to equity claimants under a CCAA plan.  
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noteholders and establishes a claims process for shareholders.61 Thus, equity claimants can 
recover part of their losses through a CCAA process and avoid risky litigation. In return, third 
parties receive a firm cap on their liability, avoiding exposure to further litigation. Firms will be 
willing to pay more for that level of certainty and control. Evidently, third-party releases can lead 
to mutually beneficial settlements for security holders and third parties under the CCAA.  
Finally, Sino-Forest Settlement sends a clear message that class members wishing to 
protect their individual rights must participate early in a CCAA process. The Objectors 
“relinquished” their rights to influence the CCAA proceedings by failing to file an individual 
proof of claim.62 As a result, they did not participate in the CCAA process until it was too late. 
Thus, the decision will encourage affected stakeholders to participate early and actively in CCAA 
proceedings, which should lead to more efficient and effective restructurings moving forward. 
CONCLUSION 
  
Sino-Forest Settlement demonstrates that third-party releases can inspire swifter 
negotiations, lead to bigger settlements and facilitate better restructurings. If a release has a 
sufficient nexus to a restructuring, it can be fair and reasonable, beneficial to all stakeholders and 
consistent with the goals of the CCAA. As well, the decision strikes an appropriate balance 
between CCAA and CPA policy considerations. The CPA is intended to promote judicial 
economy, access to justice and behaviour modification. The EY Settlement promoted judicial 
economy by avoiding lengthy litigation and parallel proceedings. All class members, including 
the Objectors, will benefit from the distribution of the EY settlement. Thus, EY Settlement 
promoted access to justice. Finally, the record-setting $117 million settlement will clearly 
motivate auditing firms to be more diligent, promoting the goal of behaviour modification.  
                                                
61 Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada (Trustees of) v Sino-Forest Corp, 2014 ONSC 62 
(Claims and Distributions Protocol at paras 8-12). 
62 Sino-Forest Settlement, supra note 1 at 78. See also Staley, Bell & Bell, supra note 59.  
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 The allegations against E&Y were serious, and the $9.1 billion class action claim reveals 
that the claimants experienced huge losses. CCAA courts should be wary of extinguishing 
individual rights in such cases. However, if a third-party release would benefit all stakeholders, 
opt-outs would undermine the spirit of compromise underlying the CCAA. Disallowing opt-outs 
motivates claimants to file claims early and to participate actively in the CCAA process. It also 
motivates third parties to offer fair settlements. Thus, it encourages cooperation under the CCAA.  
Ultimately, minority stakeholders’ rights must occasionally give way to the best interests 
of affected stakeholders as a whole. Otherwise, the benefits offered by a CCAA plan will always 
be at risk of being negated by a “tyranny by the minority.”63 Thus, Sino-Forest Settlement is a 
positive development in insolvency law. Furthermore, it clarifies the relationship between the 
CCAA and the CPA, which increases certainty for both insolvency and class action practitioners.   
 
 
 
                                                
63 ATB Financial v Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp (2008), 43 CBR (5th) 269 (ONSC) at para 
138.  
